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Introduction 
Humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HADR) operations are part of the 
Cooperative Strategy for the 21st Century Seapower of the United States (U.S.). In 
this research, we further investigate, through literature survey, whether any metrics 
can be defined and developed to enhance the efficacy and efficiency of HADR 
operations. Such measurement will be instrumental in successfully following a 
fundamental principle: “If we are going to do HADR anyway, then why not do it 
smartly.” 
In the past 2-3 decades, the United States Navy (USN)  has been the active 
and principal supplier of disaster relief due to its many unique and critical capabilities 
(Apte, Yoho, Greenfield, & Ingram, 2013; Apte, Goncalves, & Yoho, 2016). Whether 
this effort will continue and be sustained in an environment of fiscal austerity and 
budget cuts is not given. Therefore, it is critical to identify resources the USN 
possesses, due to its core competencies and capabilities, that support humanitarian 
logistics, and to understand the USN’s readiness level to utilize these resources in 
the best possible way.  
The United States Marine Corps (USMC) can rapidly respond to disasters 
because it maintains high levels of readiness on a constant basis. The USMC 
provides critical resources for these missions through their Marine Expeditionary 
Units (MEUs), which are flexible and adaptable enough to accomplish a wide range 
of operations, including non-combat missions (Apte & Yoho, 2014). Given the recent 
frequency of disasters around the world, it is probable that the occurrence of these 
events will continue, thus creating a demand for the relief capabilities. The MEUs 
have flexible and adept forces that can be deployed to austere environments while 
meeting urgent timelines (USMC, 2009).  
Background 
There have recently been significant suffering and casualties due to natural 
disasters across the world. Some governments offer humanitarian assistance. 
Figure 1 shows which donors provided the most humanitarian assistance in 2012.  
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Figure 1: Humanitarian Assistance in 2012, Top Five Government Donors. Source: Global 
Humanitarian Assistance (2013). 
The United States spent almost twice as much as the next highest donor, the 
European Union (EU). Since 2008, the United States has spent substantial capital 























Figure 2: Humanitarian Aid by United States. Source: Margesson (2015). 
When the USN steps in to help, the naval combatant commands, such as 
Pacific Command (PACOM) and Southern Command (SOUTHCOM), are the 
organizations that have to act. Figure 3 shows the economic damages in the 
different continents that are part of the area of responsibility (AOR) of Co-
Commands (COCOM). Asia has had the most economic damage, which is in the 
AOR of PACOM, and the Americas are next in economic damage, which is in the 
AOR of SOUTHCOM. 
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Figure 3: Total Economic Damage Caused by Reported Natural Disasters Between 2000 and 
2014. Adapted from Guha-Sapir, Hoyois, & Below (2014). 
After the 2010 Haiti earthquake, the functional organization and staffing of the 
COCOM had significant gaps in the ability to provide an effective and efficient 
response. A strategic plans officer for the UN said, “The military’s planning capability 
is not the most expensive part, but it is probably the most valuable. The international 
coordination structure would not have stood up if they weren’t there—we tapped into 
the Joint Task Force (JTF) planning capacity” (Joint Center for Operational Analysis 
[JCOA], 2010, slide 77). Given vast AORs, the number of disasters in the last 
decade, and the lack of lead time to prepare for relief for certain types of disasters 
(Apte, 2009), organizations such as the USN and the USMC need to have a 
playbook with readiness metrics. Therefore, three questions need to be answered:  
1. How does an organization know when it is ready to respond to a disaster 
and whether it is capable of delivering relief? 
2. What core competencies are these organizations exploiting to be ready for 
humanitarian missions? 
3. What are the resources that can deploy the capabilities that support these 
core competencies? 
We studied over 80 documents, including peer-reviewed scholarly articles, 
government documents, white papers, research papers, and DoD briefings. This 
review helped us understand the definitions and descriptions of post-disaster 
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performance indicators and pre-disaster readiness metrics. During the process, the 
literature was divided into four categories: disasters and lessons learned, civil and 
military collaboration, core competencies and capabilities, and challenges in 
humanitarian operations. These topics assist develop the path for recognizing 
readiness in humanitarian organizations. We follow the path to formulate conceptual 
model for readiness assessment. We studied four disasters in detail for the lessons 
learned: the 2010 earthquake in Haiti, the 2011 earthquake and tsunami in Japan, 
2013’s Typhoon Haiyan (Yolanda) in the Philippines, and the 2014 earthquake in 
Nepal. The literature review process helped us identify a framework for readiness 
metrics in naval humanitarian operations based on the core competencies of the 
USN and the USMC.  
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Literature Review 
Many humanitarian organizations (HOs) respond to the disasters around the 
globe. In this research, we define HOs as those organizations that provide 
humanitarian relief, whether military or non-military (NMO) and whether government 
or non-government (NGO). These organizations have core capabilities and 
competencies (Apte et al., 2016) from which they provide humanitarian assistance. 
When a disaster strikes, the host nation requests outside assistance, if needed. 
When requested, the USN and the USMC, under the guidance of USAID, get 
deployed for HADR. Other HOs also provide assistance based on their core 
competencies and capabilities. Many times, the relief falls short of meeting the 
demand. The reasons why this happens will help us understand how to measure the 
readiness that is embedded into the core capabilities and competencies of the 
organizations. Relief falls short for many possible reasons: 
• The disaster was massive in scope and scale.  
• The distribution and transportation of critical supplies and services was not 
well-managed; hence, the affected region did not receive necessary 
supplies.  
• Adequate needs assessment was not possible, resulting in mismatching of 
delivered commodities.  
• Information and knowledge was not managed from previous humanitarian 
missions to identify lessons learned.  
• In some cases lessons were learned, but no after action reports were 
generated, and as a consequence, no metrics were formulated to mitigate 
the next disaster.  
We study the literature to explore, define, and develop these reasons. Some 
areas are endogenous to the organization and some are exogenous. The 
Endogenous Factors section is further divided into the following subsections: 
• Performance Indicators and Readiness Metrics 
• Core Competencies and Capabilities, and  
• Issues and Challenges in Humanitarian Operations.  
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The Exogenous Factors section is further divided into  
• Disasters and Lessons Learned and  
• The “Three Cs” of Civil-Military Organizations.  
Endogenous Factors 
Performance Indicators and Readiness Metrics 
The absence of clear performance indicators and/or readiness metrics in 
humanitarian organizations (HOs) has been recognized by the humanitarian 
community. Davidson (2006) says that, due to the incapability and lack of time, the 
HOs do not measure the performance indicators. The organizations lack any 
fundamental framework to understand the readiness metrics since they do not have 
a good measure of performance indicators after the disaster. There are several 
factors that contribute to the difficulty of defining and measuring either the 
performance indicators or readiness metrics in HOs (Davidson, 2006).  
In the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) literature, there are discussions 
about military readiness metrics. However, these are predominantly about conflict 
readiness (Government Accountability Office [GAO], 2016). In a broad sense, the 
DoD defines readiness as the ability of the forces to combat, meet the demands to 
achieve security objectives and the needs of the national strategy. One observation 
is that the DoD’s rebuilding efforts for readiness may not work if there is not a 
comprehensive plan in place. A framework is necessary for combat readiness (GAO, 
2016). This observation further accentuates the lack of any specific framework for 
readiness metrics for missions other than war, and it demands that such a 
framework be developed. Vast amounts of money, to the tune of $350 billion, 
indicate the importance that the DoD places on the readiness of its services for 
current and future operations (Trunkey, 2013). The readiness is assessed at the 
individual service level and at the joint forces level. Typically, the DoD reports 
readiness through the Status of Resources and Training System (SORTS). Figure 4 
(Trunkey, 2013) shows an example of the SORTS reporting process. 
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C1 = the unit can fully carry out its wartime mission; C2 = the unit can carry out most of its wartime 
mission; C3 = the unit can carry out portions of its wartime mission; C4 = the unit needs additional 
resources to perform its wartime mission. 
 
The scoring scale percentages differ among the service branches. 
Figure 4: SORTS Reporting System. Source: Trunkey (2013). 
Recently SORTS, due to its limitations, was transitioned into Defense Readiness 
Reporting System (DRRS) that uses a dashboard style display. DRRS is a major 
improvement. Table 1 shows this improvement. 
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Table 1: Improvements of DRRS. Source: Trunkey (2013). 
  SORTS  DRRS   
 
Mission Readiness is reported for one highlighted 
mission that the unit was designed for 
(usually the unit’s core wartime mission).a 
 
Assessment An overall readiness score is calculated 
from scores in four resource areas. 
 
Readiness is reported for a range of 
missions and tasks including a unit’s 
wartime mission. 
 
A commander gives an overall assessment 
for each mission based on assessments of 
tasks and the resources available. 
 
Resource Areas Personnel, equipment, supply, and 
training. 
Personnel, equipment, supply, and training; 




The overall score is usually the worst of 
the four resources area scores, which are 
calculated from local unit records. 
The commander enters the overall 
assessment directly. The resource scores 
are calculated from information in 
servicewide databases. 
 
Scoring Scale A scale of C1 to C4, with C1 as the 
highest level of readiness. Units with an 
overall score of C1 or C2 are considered 
to be ready for their mission.b 
 
Each resource area is evaluated on a scale 
of 0 to 100 percent. A score of yes, no, or 
qualified yes is then given for each mission 
and task. 
 
Sources of Data Unit commanders track data and make 
calculations. 
Calculations are automatic, using 
servicewide databases. 
 
Commanders’ Input Commanders can change an overall score 
by one point. 
 
Commanders cannot adjust resource 
calculations. 
 
How the Scores are 
Reported 
 
Commanders enter the scores by hand, 
and text reports are submitted to 
headquarters via a messaging system. 
 
Reports and underlying data are generated 
automatically and are available to all users 
with appropriate credentials. 
 
Reporting Units Deployable combat and support units 
such as ships, squadrons, and brigades. 
 
Deployable combat and support units such 
as ships, squadrons, and brigades, plus 
detachments, headquarters (including 
Combatant Commands), National Guard 
units (all missions), and installations. 
 
Standardization 
Across the Services 
 
The services have different reporting 
procedures, but all reports have the same 
formatting. 
 
Each service had a distinct DRRS system. 
The systems are electronically compatible 
and are part of one common system. 
 
 
Performance objectives have been studied for the NGOs in the context to 
response supply chains established for humanitarian efforts. Table 2 lists some of 
the articles and the performance measures they discuss.  
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Output Beamon and Balcik (2008); Blecken, Hellingrath, and 
Dangelmaier (2009) 
Flexibility Beamon and Balcik (2008) 
Efficiency (resources) Beamon and Balcik (2008); Blecken et al. (2009) 
Cost Blecken et al. (2009) 
Service level 
(customer/beneficiary/donor) 
Schulz and Heigh (2009); van der Laan, de Brito, and 
Vergunst (2009); de Leeuw (2010) 
Accuracy Davidson (2006); van der Laan et al. (2009) 
Financial control and 
efficiency 
Davidson (2006); Schulz and Heigh (2009); de Leeuw 
(2010) 




Coverage, equity Davidson (2006); Balcik et al. (2010) 
Utilization Blecken et al. (2009) 
Innovation and learning Schulz and Heigh (2009); de Leeuw (2010)  
Quality of life and well Tatham and Hughes (2011) 
 
There are many more aspects to a supply chain (such as material and 
information flow, players of the supply chain) and one prevalent issue, especially in 
the commercial supply chain, is the last-mile delivery problem. In this particular issue 
efficiency or minimizing the cost is the objective. However, in response supply 
chains, the goal is more than these objectives due to humanitarian concerns. Huang, 
Smilowitz, and Balcik (2011) focus on meeting the need through quick and sufficient 
but equitable distribution. The authors measure the performance of the supply 
chains based on these three criteria. Their observations about number of vehicles, 
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routes, and impact of demand offer practical insight into relief operations. The 
performance measures suggest possible readiness metrics, such as maintaining a 
larger number of small vehicles for effective and equitable distribution of critical 
supplies and services; and they suggest some rules of thumb for quick decisions.  
Van der Laan, de Brito, and Vergunst (2009) offer a review of literature 
identifying the necessary conditions for performance measures for humanitarian 
supply chains. The authors present a framework that involves two phases, design 
and implementation. The first phase depends on strategically important functions 
and the will of the organization to measure operational performance and 
implementation of an information system to do so. The second phase, which 
depends on implementation, includes the principles that the framework be future-
oriented, that it be aligned with the selected strategy, and that it strike a balance 
between financial versus non-financial as well as quantitative and qualitative 
indicators. 
A more focused approach, focused specifically on the rapid needs 
assessment that is defined as a core competency for HOs (Apte et al., 2016), is 
discussed by Benini and Chataigner (2014). Needs assessment being the key 
objective for determining the affected region and population, the authors describe a 
particular tool “prioritization matrix,” recently a prevalent tool in determining demand. 
They offer expansion of this tool based on logic behind it. The matrix is based on 
composite indicators that are managed through spreadsheets and is the intersection 
of decision science and humanitarian operations. The authors use the data from the 
2013 Typhoon Haiyan (Yolanda) in the Philippines to substantiate their analysis.  
Norio, Ye, Kajitani, Shi, & Tatano (2011) review the causes and impacts of 
the 2010 Japan earthquake and tsunami. The management of the expanded 
capacity and capability after the 1995 Hanshin-Awaji earthquake in Japan 
significantly helped provide disaster relief for the 2010 earthquake. However, the 
authors believe more can be done. When there is potential for a disaster to turn into 
a crisis (as in the 2010 earthquake and tsunami in Japan), it is necessary to deploy a 
collaborative framework based on available resources. Such a framework should 
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take into account the geographic scope of the disaster, thus enabling different 
governance approaches and mutual assistance and recovery systems. The authors 
believe that centralized power for sudden and dispersed disasters is vital, existence 
of a new international platform for joint management is essential, further research of 
such frameworks is needed, and the lessons learned from the 2010 Japan 
earthquake and tsunami mandate that infrastructure around the nuclear power 
plants be robustly planned and designed.  
Figure 2 showed the extent of humanitarian aid provided by the United 
States. The DoD executes humanitarian operations with the budget granted by the 
State Department, since the DoD does not have its own budget for HADR. These 
humanitarian activities are rendered through the Overseas Humanitarian Disaster 
and Civic Aid (OHDACA) program. All HOs, including the DoD, currently face the 
challenge of measuring the impact of their work (Bonaventre, 2006). Bonaventre 
(2006) lists at least three reasons why the DoD should measure the impact of 
humanitarian assistance programs:  
• First, measuring the impact of HOs offers opportunities for future and mid-
course corrections in the projects through feedback loops enabling 
planners to underscore activities that are cost-effective.  
• Second, collection and sharing of data prevents the duplication of 
activities performed by all HOs. Not duplicating activities helps us 
understand the core competencies and capabilities of HOs. 
• Third, analysis based on collected data offers transparency and 
quantifiable results that do not leave any ambiguity.  
The key point here is understanding core competencies and capabilities of all the 
organizations involved so duplication of efforts is reduced.   
Core Competencies and Capabilities 
Apte et al. (2016) identify the competencies and capabilities that are core to 
U.S. military and non-military organizations (NMOs) for HADR. The authors’ 
motivation is that both military organizations and NMOs bring assets, skills, and 
capabilities to a humanitarian crisis; however, their competencies and capabilities 
are very diverse. Identification of the specific competencies and capabilities that are 
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core to these types of organizations can enable better planning by both military and 
NMOs, allowing them to achieve greater effectiveness and efficiency in their 
humanitarian responses. Apte et al. (2016) build on existing literature on the core 
competency of the corporations in the private sector. In their research, Apte et al. 
(2016) extend the concept of identifying, cultivating, and exploiting the core 
capabilities of the private sector to other organizations that seek to respond 
efficiently and effectively to disasters. They develop a Core Competencies Test for 
such organizations. The authors list the top five essential services and capabilities 
for disaster relief as Information and Knowledge Management, Needs Assessment, 
Supply, Distribution and Deployment, and Health Services Support. 
One of the substantial players in humanitarian assistance and disaster relief 
around the globe is the U.S. Navy (USN). Roughead, Morrison, Cullison, and 
Gannon (2013) offer an in-depth analysis of the USN’s humanitarian assistance, 
especially in the face of budget cuts and austerity. Their research does not focus on 
a specific disaster, but rather studies the proactive engagement or strategic pre-
positioning (Apte, 2014) of humanitarian assistance. The authors describe the 
principal benefits of their research: strengthening relations in critical geographic 
areas through greater cultural understanding, improving the capabilities and 
readiness of the USN humanitarian assistance, and reinforcing other capabilities 
such as health systems of host nations.  
HADR by the USN is evaluated by Apte, Yoho, Greenfield, and Ingram 
(2013), using a structured, qualitative evaluation schema complemented by expert 
ratings. The authors evaluate the capabilities and utility of ships in the USN. They 
find that there are specific types of vessels with significant disaster response utility 
and recommend a flotilla type that would be best suited for the humanitarian 
operations. Utilizing an exploratory framework that evaluates three diverse disaster 
cases, they scale the utility of each vessel through subject matter expertize. They 
find the type of ships most useful for contributing to effective disaster response.  
Apte and Yoho (2014) study the USMC resources, including the Marine 
Expeditionary Unit (MEU), that are primarily responsible for the response. They 
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study recent HADR events to determine how demands were met by the USMC. 
They identify the supplies that can meet these demands by examining both assets 
and capabilities of the USMC. By exploring significant gaps, if any, that can be 
improved by the MEU, they suggest ways to improve the effectiveness of the 
USMC’s response to HADR. A primary take-away from their work is the challenge 
faced by the USMC to match the capabilities of the USMC to the demand created by 
future disasters. More issues and challenges in humanitarian operations that deliver 
disaster relief are described in the next subsection.  
Issues and Challenges in Humanitarian Operations 
Roughead et al. (2013) list the operational challenges for the USN, such as 
short-term or discontinuous engagement in HADR lacking enduring coordination and 
development, insufficient integration with host nations and NGO operatives, 
dependence on sole assets of vessels that may not serve the necessary demand, 
inadequate and irregular funding, and most notably, difficulty in measuring alignment 
of humanitarian efforts with strategic goals. The authors recommend that the USN 
clarify and focus on the motivation behind the humanitarian assistance to fund the 
operations sufficiently and without rigidity, and increase the scope and scale of the 
planning process of HADR allowing coordination with NGOs and host nations. But 
most importantly they point out that the USN needs to develop and implement a 
robust set of metrics for readiness in humanitarian missions.  
A major challenge in any supply chain management is measurement of 
performance of that supply chain. In the commercial sector, the focus is on 
resources for optimizing the input (cost) or output (profit). However, for a supply 
chain established to respond to a disaster, a response supply chain (RSC), the focus 
is on the time required to respond or the ability to meet the demand. An RSC is 
defined to be efficient based on the amount or number of resources used to meet 
the goal of that organization and to be effective based on the level at which it meets 
the preset goal (Beamon, 2004). Developing such a system for measurement is one 
of the issues associated with RSCs. The author lists the issues as structure of the 
RSC, distribution network, inventory control, type of measuring system, coordination 
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with other organizations involved in HA, acquisition of supplies, and finally, the 
actual measurement.  
Beamon and Kotleba (2006) describe the stochasticity of the demand of the 
disaster, and if the disaster is large-scale, the strain that it creates on the physical 
distribution. Figure 5 shows the complexity and hence difficulty of humanitarian 
operations (Apte & Yoho, 2013). 
 
Figure 5: Classification of Disasters. Source: Apte & Yoho (2013). 
Other issues that are challenging are the inadequate or incorrect estimation of 
demands that yield both further casualties and further suffering in the affected area 
(United Nations, 2007; Duran, Gutierrez, & Keskinocak, 2011; Apte & Yoho, 2011; 
World Meteorological Organization, 2009). Estimating where and when such 
demand is needed (McCoy, 2008; Apte, 2009; Apte et al., 2013) is even harder. 
Demand after a disaster strike in the host nation is external to the organization 
providing relief. We now focus on such exogenous factors.  
Exogenous Factors 
Disasters and Lessons Learned: Haiti 
On January 10, 2010, a 7.0 magnitude earthquake struck Haiti near Port-au-
Prince. The earthquake caused 316,000 casualties. In addition to the Haitian losses, 
the earthquake also claimed the lives of members of the United Nations Stabilization 
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Mission in Haiti. It injured 300,000 people, made one million people homeless, it 
collapsed 100,000, and damaged 200,000 structures. This earthquake decimated 
Haiti’s infrastructure. Air and sea transportation was reduced to unworkable. Key 
access roads were impassable. The medical facilities also became practically 
nonexistent. The most critical shortage was fuel. The utility infrastructure, including 
electricity and telecommunications, fell apart. The paralyzed Haitian government 
was overwhelmed and requested immediate assistance from all over the world. The 
Dominican Republic received thousands of refugees, but being a small country, it 
had limitations. Haiti’s urgent request to the U.S. government prompted an 
immediate response.  
Even before the disaster, Haiti had fuel and water shortages as an 
underdeveloped country. Medical support was scarce. So after the disaster, 
conditions worsened quickly. Poor infrastructure and inadequate disaster 
preparedness limited the delivery of relief (McCunn et al., 2010). Though access to 
the airport was limited, the U.S. Air Force (USAF) stepped in to maintain security 
and air traffic control. After this rapid and successful transition, medical support was 
delivered by many HOs including the U.S. military and other military organizations, 
NGOs, and government organizations.  
The earthquake damaged the Port of Haiti, and it was not operable. The bulk 
of supplies for immediate sustainment had to be delivered by sea. The lack of a 
designated logistics team within the Global Response Team at the Joint Task Force 
(JTF) headquarters meant that deployment planning had to be done at short notice, 
thus increasing obstacles to an already challenged supply chain. Many in the JTF 
team were not in the contingency status and, hence, were deployed with suboptimal 
preparation. This resulted in pushing the supplies quickly but in an ad-hoc way 
without formal planning, sourcing, and tracking processes. A substantial part of the 
bureaucracy was eliminated, which enabled a quick response. 
The accomplishments of the JTF during Haiti HADR can be divided into the 
following areas: Air Port, Sea Port, DoD medical support, shelters, overall support, 
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and a secure environment for the operations (JCOA, 2010, slide 196). Best practices 
emerged from these activities: 
• Deployment and support from strategic level liaisons to tactical level 
(National response) 
• Use of unclassified operation environment for information sharing and 
collaboration between all stakeholders (COCOM) 
• Establishing JTF Force Flow working group (Force projection) 
• Interface between Humanitarian Assistance Coordination Center and Joint 
Operational Task Center and NGOs, Private Voluntary Organizations 
(PVO)s, and UN systems (Coordination) 
• Establishing Joint Interagency Information Cell 
After response to the 2010 Haiti earthquake there were many lessons 
learned. One of the important findings from the HADR provided by the Joint Center 
for Operational Analysis (JCOA) was  the swift establishment of response structure 
(JCOA, 2010). . Also, civilian and military resources were pushed not only to resolve 
but to overcome the problem. This was done by (1) pre-established Response 
Management Team (RMT) that is dependent on the classification of the disaster 
(Apte, 2009) performed in five functional areas: management, planning, logistics, 
administrative and communications; (2) Joint Staff Team plugging in with RMT and 
turned out to be the best practice despite not having connectivity other than 
commercial internet. However, USAID had visibility for movement of DoD resources.  
As long term planning for future disaster relief some implications could be 
described as follows: 
• The president’s declaration about making the disaster relief a priority 
would help the administration and the country focus on the effort.  
• Civilian and military resources may be pushed to mitigate the disaster by 
establishing the national response structure rapidly. 
• Roles, responsibilities, authorities, and essential capabilities need to be 
clarified at the outset. 
• Division of labor within the DoD should be clearly defined. 
• Integration of HOs may raise many policy issues that need to be resolved. 
• Incomplete data on the ground at the onset of the disaster is a challenge 
for logistics requirements and priorities.  
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LTG Keen, who was in charge of Operation Unified Response had the 
following observations: 
1. Respond quickly and effectively,  
2. Protect the people always,  
3. Build partnerships with key players,  
4. Coordinate and Collaborate (C2) to achieve unity of effort,  
5. Communicate – Communicate – Communicate,  
6. Support the lead Federal Agency within clearly defined roles,  
7. Pull from all available resources to form the Joint Task Force,  
8. Include the Host Nation Government as much as possible,  
9. Work Closely with the UN Humanitarian Community, and  
10. Anticipate challenges with Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs).  
(JCOA, 2010, slide 208)  
Haiti also taught a few lessons to COCOM. They had to overcome internal 
organizational issues, gain situational awareness, and satisfy an extraordinary 
demand for information. Another lesson was that the use of “open” communications 
and unclassified information sharing over BlackBerry devices allowed for expanded 
coordination and collaboration with DoD organizations. Personal and professional 
relationships among key leaders permeated all levels of interaction and engagement 
within organizations. And lastly, quick establishment of land-based headquarters 
reassured the affected population and enhanced the coordination with the host 
country, state government, USAID, UN, and NGOs. 
Disasters and Lessons Learned: Japan 
On March 11, 2011, a 9.0 magnitude earthquake struck Japan. A tsunami 
followed soon after and the losses incurred were extremely severe. By April 13, 
there were 13,392 casualties, 15,133 missing people, and more than 335,000 
people without food, water, shelter, and medical help (Norio et al., 2011). Several 
nuclear power plants were heavily damaged resulting in rolling blackouts. The 
earthquake also affected the transportation system, and for a short time, all the 
ports were closed. Part of the high speed rail line was shut down, and the Sendai 
airport suffered intensive damage due to the tsunami. But the devastating blow that 
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pushed this disaster into a crisis was the meltdown of the Fukushima nuclear power 
plant.  
Carafano (2011) assesses the response to the 2011 earthquake in Japan 
and outlines the lessons for the U.S. to evaluate its own capacity to deal with a 
future crisis. The author studies critical areas and the corresponding key findings 
and resources in the United States (see Table 3). 
Wilson (2012) has a focused view based on the response from the U.S., titled 
Operation Tomodachi, to the 2011 earthquake and tsunami in Japan. The response 
efforts and the collective use of the military stationed abroad offers a model for 
further U.S. efforts across the globe. The author identifies the activities that worked 
well such as the value of maintaining U.S. forces abroad, the use and capabilities of 
remotely piloted aircrafts, the voluntary evacuation of the U.S. dependents, bilateral 
coordination, and the benefit of social media through the disaster response. 
However, the lessons learned, such as improving bilateral coordination, removing 
control and command confusion, and preparing for large scale decontamination are 
also critical for handling future disasters. The author concludes that describing the 
success of Operation Tomodachi will induce lesser cuts in the DoD’s budget since it 
will bring humanitarian assistance to the forefront as opposed to combat operations 
in Iraq and Afghanistan.  
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Table 3: Critical Areas and Key Findings. Source:  Carafano (2011). 
Preparedness 
and Response 
• Effective planning, preparedness, and mitigation measures with 
possible decentralization for execution of this plan 
• Need to nurture a national culture of preparedness by concentrating 
on self-reliance in communities as well as individuals 
Communicating 
the Risk 
• Community awareness and understanding risk through 
communication fetches better cost effective results than protection 
measures such as building seawalls. 




• The United States and, based on history, Japan have difficulty 
receiving aid. The United States needs to bolster its capacity to 
accept and apply international aid efficiently. 
Critical 
Infrastructure 
• Need to focus on the most ‘vital’ infrastructure (United States–
Canada grid) to maintain resilient infrastructure that can recover 
quickly in case of disaster.  
• Industry and federal regulators need to work together to understand 
lessons from Fukushima and how they can be adapted for nuclear 
disasters in the United States. 
 
Terada (2012) notes that during the assistance and relief following the 2011 
earthquake in Japan, information should have been shared and appropriate tasking 
should have been implemented among the participants. There should be more 
training and exercises for USJF as the DoD support for HADR increases so that 
professionalism is enhanced and roles are clarified (Staff, 2012).  
Japan is a developed nation and fairly self-sufficient in disaster relief. 
However, it did not have much experience in receiving aid from across the world. 
Thus, one of the lessons learned was to institute training for international guidelines 
(Smart, 2012). It is also imperative to establish an effective media strategy for 
controlling and dissipating information when there is a need of receiving real time 
facts.  
Katoch (2012) stresses that no silos should be permitted. Clear protocols 
should be set with chain of control at all levels of the departments involved of the 
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host government, military organizations, and NGOs. Organizational structures and 
processes, in compliance with humanitarian and military doctrines, must be pre-
established at local, national, and international levels. Only close ties with such 
organizations is not adequate for productive civil-military coordination. This was 
evident during the 2011 earthquake in Japan in the coordinating pains experienced 
by the United States and Japan even though they are allies (Katoch, 2012).  
Wanlach (2012) emphasizes establishing relationships before a disaster to 
share information. The author also claims that agreements have to be in place for 
practical methods of coordination and the relief needs to be planned so that the 
strengths of the responding organization are exploited. Finally, better preparation by 
the host country will always help mitigate suffering.  
The 2011 earthquake in Japan also taught lessons about the geographical 
perspective. Developing a tsunami response system using inundation maps helps 
disaster managers to model the potential effects of a tsunami so that the most 
suitable shelter locations and optional evacuation routes can be planned (Hong, 
2012). Such lessons were also taught by Super Typhoon Haiyan (Yolanda) in the 
Philippines in 2014. Shallow draft adds to the destruction due to the fact that it 
produces more surges. Therefore, to understand threats, warnings must be 
accompanied by analysis of the impacts on the ground (Center for Excellence in 
Disaster Management and Humanitarian Assistance [CFE-DM], 2015). 
Disasters and Lessons Learned: Philippines 
On November 8, 2013, Typhoon Haiyan (Yolanda) made landfall in the 
Philippines causing extensive damage. More than 1.1 million houses were damaged, 
and 14.1 million people were affected. The confirmed death toll was 6,183. Though 
the Philippines is one of the most disaster-prone countries, this typhoon was among 
the strongest ever to strike the country.  
The extensive damage to the internal infrastructure made transportation of 
goods extremely difficult to the point that signs of assistance and relief were only 
visible three to five days after the typhoon struck the Philippines (CFE-DM, 2014). 
Acquisition Research Program 
Graduate School of Business & Public Policy - 21 - 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Among the international community, both military and non-military, the U.S. DoD, 
supporting the Armed Forces of the Philippines, and USAID played a significant role 
in HADR. UN agencies also responded immediately with teams for initial rapid 
assessment.  
The heavy vertical lift capabilities of U.S. DoD and other military organizations 
helped in the face of infrastructure destruction. Their capabilities also helped in 
scouring the thousands of affected islands that were remote and almost impossible 
to access. The tactical military forces provided support immediately. There were 
many assets of the U.S. DoD stationed in Japan and Okinawa. These included USS 
George Washington naval task force and 31st MEU to form JTF 505. Approximately 
1000 U.S. DoD personnel were deployed. Military aircraft provided support in needs 
assessment of remote areas, brought aid workers and supplies to these remote 
areas, and evacuated the affected population to other locations. The Marines helped 
in clearing roads and distributing supplies and services (Lum & Margesson, 2014). 
One of the lessons learned (CFE-DM, 2014) during the Super Typhoon 
Haiyan assistance and relief was that civil-military collaboration needs to happen far 
faster than it did. It is also important to have trust among participating organizations, 
and this could be achieved through informal networks formed during training and 
exercises. It was also noted that the affected people from the most dangerous areas 
have to be evacuated. But two concepts that are important and applicable in any 
disaster, are the pre-positioning of supplies and the resilience of the local population.  
In addition, visual messaging in the form of accurate scenario-based storm 
surge inundation maps facilitated a shared framework of the operating environment. 
Every foreign disaster response is a bilateral agreement between the assisting state 
and the affected state. The response in Super Typhoon Haiyan showed that the 
optimal use of defense assets is best coordinated through the Multinational 
Coordination Center (MNCC). Recognizing the need for the MNCC to operate at 
strategic and operational levels simultaneously, the MNCC in Camp Aguinaldo 
became fully operational 48 hours before Super Typhoon Hagupit the following year 
made landfall (CFE-DM, 2015). Recognizing the need to augment the government’s 
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response capabilities, private sector-led organizations, as demonstrated by the 
Philippine Disaster Resilience Foundation (PDRF) 88, began putting mechanisms in 
place for a disaster operations center aimed at coordinating and collaborating 
disaster risk management initiatives of businesses across all industrial sectors. The 
difference between the after effects of the two typhoons is shown in Table 4.  
Table 4: Comparison of Effects of Typhoons Haiyan and Hagupit. Source: CFE-DM (2015). 












Families Affected 3,424,593 944,249 
Individuals Affected 16,078,181 4,149,484 
Deaths 6,300 18 













Disasters and Lessons Learned: Nepal 
On April 25, 2015, a 7.8 magnitude earthquake struck Nepal followed by 20 
aftershocks. On May 12, 2015, a 7.3 magnitude earthquake with five aftershocks 
struck near Mount Everest. Within a week, there were 7,000 casualties, 70,000 
structures damaged, and over eight million people affected (Sanderson & 
Ramalingam, 2015). The earthquakes and their aftershocks resulted in over 5,000 
landslides, flooding many streams with sediments, and causing floods in low lying 
areas. This made the task of transporting supplies and services nearly impossible.  
The U.S. DoD deployed soft and hard assets for HADR. The 3rd Marine 
Expeditionary Brigade (MEB) and other forces formed the JTF 505 to respond to this 
disaster under the guidance of USAID. There was substantial support for evacuation 
by JTF aircraft, transportation of local ambulances by JTF 505 medical personnel, 
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including squadron flight surgeons and DART physicians. However, being a 
landlocked country at a high elevation presented its own set of unsurmountable 
issues. This tested rotary wing and tilt rotor aircraft endurance. Another unique 
obstacle in providing relief was complications due to diplomatic requirements of 
coordination in overflight and clearances from multiple countries surrounding the 
affected area.  
In addition to the substantial HADR delivered by the U.S. DoD, the 
Government of India responded within four hours due to the proximity with open 
borders, close cultural ties with Nepal, relationship with the Armed Forces, and 
bilateral pre-disaster planning and training. The Chinese government also 
responded at the request of the Nepalese government with search and rescue 
teams, helicopters, and 900 personnel. The World Health Organization, the UN 
Cluster System, international military forces, and other HOs added their support to 
the disaster relief. 
One of the dreadful challenges was properly caring for children whose 
parents were missing. Urgent repair of the roads for immediate transportation was 
also a formidable challenge that could have been mitigated through helipads in rural 
areas. The inadequate collection of field information and dissemination of the same 
turned out to be a major handicap. Establishing call centers in each village would 
help overcome this difficulty. Due to damaged government structures, the basic 
problem of lack of office space, though not life-threatening, was a deterrent. This 
meant the building codes had not been followed and strict monitoring should have 
been implemented. Inadequate search and rescue capabilities turned out to be 
devastating, so one lesson learned was to strengthen the overall search and rescue 
capability through security forces and international support.  
Wendelbo et al. (2016) outline the challenges in executing disaster relief and 
the lessons learned after the Nepal earthquake, as described in Table 5. 
Acquisition Research Program 
Graduate School of Business & Public Policy - 24 - 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Table 5: Challenges and Lessons Learned in Nepal. Source: Wendelbo et al. (2016). 
Planning: In spite of sound planning for disasters, the efforts fell short. The 
framework with rules and regulations were not fully funded and therefore 
not enforced.  




Though the damage to the infrastructure and public facilities was 
mitigated through inside as well as outside help, the rural households 
remained damaged.  
Logistical 
challenges: 
Being a poor and underdeveloped country, the infrastructure in Nepal 
was inadequate. The country has a single airport, which turned out to be 
the bottleneck. The relief efforts could not be utilized in spite of 
sufficiently available supply, and some teams had to return without 
delivering the aid.  
Communication:  Nepal’s communication networks physically and virtually collapsed, so 
the local responders could not convey the existing conditions and needs 
to the authorities. 
Coordination:  The inadequate physical infrastructure, before and after the disaster, 
intensified the lack of coordination between HOs delivering support. 
Misdirected 
focus: 
Trendy methodologies were used by some HOs that are costly for locals 
to sustain, such as K9 teams for search and rescue instead of more 
efficient methods. 
Funding: Though about US $4 billion was pledged within a month, when Nepalese 
government launched the recovery efforts, not all the funds came 
through. Perhaps it was due to lack of fulfilling the promises on the 
donors’ part or not having faith in utilization of the funds by the host 
nation. 
 
The overwhelming support from HOs across the globe complicated relief 
efforts in Nepal. Nepal had only one runway airport and very few helicopters to 
transport relief workers to the inaccessible mountainous areas. Unfortunately, the 
lessons learned in the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami were not well understood or 
implemented (Salmeron & Apte, 2010). After the tsunami, the donated supplies that 
could have mitigated needs to a large extent could not be distributed due to a single 
airstrip and a single fork-lift in Banda Ache (Apte, 2009).  
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Summary of Lessons Learned 
No amount of planning for disasters can prevent casualties, suffering, and 
damages. But “good” planning, based on lessons learned from past disasters, can 
mitigate the effects of the disaster. However, a significant theme that emerges from 
the literature review is articulated by Markus (2012) – the sharing of information 
among stakeholders in terms of their mandates, activity scope, capacity, technical 
expertise, and funding capital has to happen before a disaster strikes.  
The U.S. DoD is one of the organizations providing HADR in the Asia-Pacific 
region with other government organizations, NGOs. Moroney, Pezard, Miller, 
Engstrom, and Doll (2013) claim that the following changes need to be made to 
spread goodwill through HADR: 
• Improve the DoD’s efficiency in HADR  
• Enhance interagency coordination  
• Develop coordination with the host nation 
• Increase work with the UN and NGOs  
• Align security activities and regional HADR capabilities  
Another organization that plays a major role in humanitarian operations is the 
Logistics Cluster of the United Nations (UN). Global Logistics Cluster (2016) has 
extensively studied the relief provided in the past disasters to understand the 
lessons from these experiences. The lessons learned are tabulated in Table 6. 
Table 6: Lessons Learned by Global Logistics Cluster. 
Coordination Mechanisms such as meetings for unifying response, reduction of 
duplication in logistics operations and identification of common needs 
Information 
Management 
Website managed by the cluster providing maps, Geographic Information 




Humanitarian staging areas need to be pre-established so they can be 
activated immediately, thus reducing delays in delivery. Existing support 
services such as pre-positioned equipment and their handlers, fleet of 
vehicles with smaller secondary vehicles, air ambulances operated by 
local staff added significantly to the success of certain occurrences. The 
shortcomings, however, were delays in air transport capacity that led to 
reduction in cost-effectiveness. 
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The authors recommend that investments should be made in pre-
preparedness activities that have turned out to be invaluable in certain instances. 
They also comment on the information management tools used, such as having an 
accessible system to enrich the competency further. In terms of accountability, the 
authors suggest that there should be clarification of roles and responsibilities 
associated with them in addition to pre-established tracking system. Most 
importantly, coordination efforts between the strategic partners in preparedness 
planning and advisory board for decision-makers should be done with priority given 
to logistics.  
Evans (2016) outlines necessity of interagency training as the lesson learned. 
The author describes the lessons as (1) a Mobile Training Team traveling to 
disaster-prone areas and offering training to country teams, (2) Adding courses at 
the end of annually held conferences at USPACOM, and (3) Incorporating a specific 
and significant disaster management content into existing preparatory courses.  
Advantages from these lessons are that each member of the DoD will go 
through the training so that participants will learn about 
• Available resources 
• Utilization of the same 
• Lessons from previous disasters 
• Relevant topics they may face such as basic search and rescue, medical 
first responder 
• Appreciation of options available during the lifecycle of the disaster 
Issues and Challenges in the “Three Cs” of Civil-Military Organizations  
Civil-military organizations are needed to establish, maintain, influence, and 
exploit relations between military, government, and non-government organizations, 
including the host country of the disaster. The “three Cs” for civil military 
organizations are communication, coordination, and collaboration. With 
complimentary capabilities and competencies other government and non-
government organizations participate with the U.S. in HADR. Therefore it is essential 
that coordination and communication among all these organizations be explored and 
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enhanced. The premise is that such processes will enable the DoD to respond 
efficiently and effectively with the unique capabilities that they possess in the future 
of limited budgets (Apte et al., 2016; Moroney et al., 2013).  
The type of collaboration between military and non-military organizations is 
predominantly determined by the disaster classification. Logistical support and 
delivery of supplies continues irrespective of the alliance (Pettit & Beresford, 2005). 
The authors propose a model for logistical requirements in the affected regions. The 
model is given in Figure 6. 
 
Figure 6: Proposed Model. Source: Pettit & Beresford (2005). 
The authors also present issues and challenges for measuring disaster 
preparedness and response. These factors can help in developing the framework for 
readiness metrics. More importantly, the authors describe the possible conflicts 
arising from military involvement in humanitarian crises. Table 7 describes these 
conflicts. 
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Table 7: Conflicts Arising From Military Involvement. Source: Pettit & Beresford (2005). 
Medical care Military medicine is not necessarily appropriate for humanitarian 
crises. Supplies readily available to military forces may be 
inappropriate for refugees and disaster victims, although at the 
outset of a crisis they may be all that is available. 
Conflict resolution Military forces are not well suited to aid long-term redevelopment 
efforts. The imposition of security by outside military forces may 
also impede negotiation and conflict resolution. 
Interaction with other 
organizations 
Military commanders may be unfamiliar with the roles of major 
international organizations, and, conversely, civilians will have 
little experience of military organizations. There will be 
differences in strategy, objectives, and tactics. 
Conflict with 
humanitarian agenda 
Using military resources to achieve humanitarian goals creates 
tension and can undermine the appearance of neutrality of relief 
organizations. 
Adequacy of training Few military officers receive training in disaster relief or 
humanitarian assistance. There is also likely to be ambiguity over 
the role of military physicians in complex emergencies in 
international humanitarian law. 
Limited commitment to 
disaster response 
The principal mission of the military is to resolve military conflicts, 
and, generally, less effort and fewer resources are devoted to 
humanitarian aid unless an HA-specific mission is being 
conducted. 
In November 2005, a DoD directive defined “stability operations” as a “core 
US military mission” with a Priority comparable to combat operations” (DoD, 2005). 
This directive recommends the use of outcome-based performance measure and 
installing process for transparency of information. Reaves, Schor, and Burkle (2008) 
describe the gaps in the DoD’s ability to measure the effects of HADR operations 
when compared with international standards. The authors’ analysis reveals that only 
0.7% of the 1000 after action reports studied, refer to performance measures. The 
authors conclude that most of the humanitarian operations performed by the DoD 
did not have records to identify the activities that could be quantified for most 
contribution to the HADR. In a focused study Reineck (2004) estimates readiness 
and deployability index for emergency centers registered nurses to prepare for 
disaster relief.  
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U.S. Forces in Japan (USFJ) maintained necessary coordination and daily 
workings with the State Department (Embassy in Japan) and Japan Self-Defense 
Forces (JSDF; Terrada, 2012). This was informally done without any structured 
support at operational level of command and control.  
Yoshitomi et al. (2012) describe the bilateral coordination between JSDF and 
USFJ. They suggest that the solution to preparedness issues may be establishing a 
standing bilateral coordination center that is staffed with people from both the forces 
so they could share information and plan before the disaster strikes. They also 
recommend that for effective coordination, more activities and exercises are needed. 
This will enable clarification of communications, roles, missions, and capabilities with 
the counterparts of other nations. Acquisition and interagency agreements are 
necessary to pre-position supplies and services. For successful coordination, it is 
also essential to understand the capabilities and equipment of the host nation 
counterparts.  
Japan is one of the best prepared countries for earthquake in the world but 
had limited experience in receiving international assistance (Katoch, 2012). Absence 
of institutionalized civil-military coordination is a significant void that is exacerbated 
when a country is facing a super disaster or crisis. In spite of this, the Great East 
Japan Earthquake (GEJE) of 2012 is a great example of coordination between 
JSDF, USFJ, Swiss Humanitarian Aid Unit (SHA), and German Federal Agency for 
Technical Relief (THW; Terada, 2012; Smart, 2012; Fichter, 2012). 
At a national level, cooperation between the Red Cross and Red Crescent 
Movement (RCRC) and military is common, but this cooperation gets complex when 
military assets are involved in an international context in the case of natural disaster 
(Markus, 2012). Guidelines from RCRC state that “while maintaining a dialogue with 
armed forces at all levels, the components of Movement preserve their 
independence of decision-making and action, in order to ensure adequate access to 
all people in need of humanitarian assistance” (Counsel of Delegates, 2005).  
Super Typhoon Haiyan (Yolanda) was notably one of the best instances of 
the civil-military coordination (CFE-DM, 2014). There were many previous 
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experiences from the disasters in the Philippines that contributed to the disaster 
relief. However, connections between personnel involved in the relief and other 
players helped expedite the collaboration between civil and military organizations.  
There were 57 countries contributing to the relief operations in Super 
Typhoon Haiyan. Multinational Coordinate Center (MNCC) was set up for this 
purpose with 29 foreign militaries that responded to the disaster. The coordination 
predominantly revolved around warehousing, transportation, and distribution—that 
is, logistics. However, a lack of framework for a common operating process and a 
lack of consensus on needs assessment ended up causing a duplication of efforts in 
the face of scarce resources. The study by Center for Excellence in Disaster 
Management  (CFE-DM, 2015) shows the following best practices:  
Best Practice1: A commonly understood “end-to end warning system” 
prepares a nation for crises 
Best Practice2: Bilateral commitment executed multilaterally on the 
ground through the Multinational Coordination Center (MNCC) 
promotes optimal civilian use of foreign defense assets. 
Best Practice3: When closely coordinated with the government, the 
private sector multiplies a nation’s surge capacity to meet the life-
saving needs of the affected population. (p. 5) 
The authors of CFE-DM (2015) conclude that advances in civil-military 
coordination occur when (1) consensus in the operating environment paves the way 
for unity of effort; (2) systemic changes through an inclusive multi-sectoral approach 
streamlines disparate efforts on emergency response preparedness; (3) a 
convergence in concepts, frameworks, protocols, and procedures maintains a clear 
distinction of responsibilities and national sovereignty; and (4) institutionalized 
internal and external partnerships augment a country’s latent ability to surge. 
The U.S. Operational Detachment-Alpha (ODA) served in Philippines during 
Super Typhoon Haiyan. This was not unique to the Philippines; ODA also served in 
Nepal. In the aftermath of the 2015 Nepal earthquake, two teams of the ODA, 1121 
and 1126, happened to be in Khatmandu, Nepal (Elwood, 2016). They stayed on to 
help with the HADR mission since U.S. Special Forces Green Berets are known for 
their capability in diverse tasks of special warfare during combat missions and in 
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training with partner forces in coordinating exercises. This came in critical use in 
Nepal. The beneficial aspect of ODA can be exploited methodically if the team can 
be incorporated in a contingency plan for military-military collaboration. The 
competencies of Special Forces to react instantly with pre-established relationships 
and resources, critical language skills, and flexibility could then be utilized.  
There was significant anticipation for a catastrophic earthquake in Nepal 
among many international governments and military organizations. This projection 
helped in a broad response from all the organizations when the actual disaster 
occurred. The United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs 
(UNOCHA) led the effort for civil-military coordination through Humanitarian Military 
Coordination Center (HuMOCC; Tarantino, Suter, & Cooper, 2016). In Nepal, the 
military participation came in the areas of logistics and transportation, in addition to 
health and medical support. 
The model for civil-military cooperation in disaster relief is the support 
provided by Joint Task Force (JTF) 505 and USAID to the 2015 Nepal earthquake 
(Bock, 2016). The author credits the success to the Mission Tasking Matrix (MITAM) 
Process. The major contributions of this tool are as follows: 
• Transparency in information about needs, number of response 
participants, requirements, and coordination challenges 
• Military planners’ ability to expedite the planning process and 
analyze if JTF has the resources and authority to fill it 
• The DoD’s doctrine of supporting USAID 
• Maintaining cost efficiency 
• Constraining focus on specific requirements to avoid mission creep  
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Framework Based on Literature Survey 
Unfortunately, the absence of quantifiable or measurable performance 
indicators or readiness metrics in humanitarian organizations (HOs) has been 
acknowledged by organizations that are involved in HADR whether they be military 
or not. Literature on critical best practices for performance measurement describe 
that the metrics should be aligned with the objective. The objective in the case of the 
U.S. DoD according to the Cooperative Strategy for the 21st Century Seapower is to 
provide HADR with capabilities that complement the capabilities of other HOs in 
such operations. Learning from the lessons discussed previously in this article will 
help the U.S. DoD be effective and efficient in HADR and at the same time spread 
goodwill through the world by HADR.  
Readiness is defined by the DoD as the ability of the U.S. military to fight for 
and meet the needs of the national strategy. No comprehensive plan exists, thus 
emphasizing that a framework is necessary readiness. There exist marked gaps 
between the way the DoD measures the performance of HADR and the international 
standards. It has been noted that out of 1000 after action reports studied only 0.7% 
even mention performance (Reaves et al., 2008). 
Some of the reasons, as expressed before, that the DoD should measure the 
impact of humanitarian assistance programs are as follows: (1) Measuring them 
offers opportunities for future and mid-course corrections in the projects through 
feedback loops enabling planners to underscore activities that are cost-effective, (2) 
the collection and sharing of data decreases the likelihood that HOs duplicate 
activities , and (3) analysis based on collected data offers transparency and 
quantifiable results that do not leave any ambiguity. 
However, operational challenges exist. Current naval HADR responses are 
mostly reactive, not proactive or preplanned and sustainable engagements. Such 
activities do not necessarily align with the strategic goal. Lessons learned point to 
deficient integration with host nations and other HOs. More importantly, the reliance 
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of the USN on vessels alone may not provide adequate HADR due to the complete 
dependence on the deployment of ships irrespective of their capabilities.  
Figure 7 shows the endogenous and exogenous processes of the 
organizations providing relief to the affected region. Core competencies that are 





























Figure 7: Process for Identifying Readiness Metrics in Organizations. 
Originating from the core competencies and capabilities the organizations 
establish response supply chains (RSC) for products, services, and information. This 
step is endogenous to the organization. The response supply chains have their own 
issues and challenges inherent to the organization. The HADR delivered is at the 
intersection of establishment of RSC, an endogenous process of an organization 
and the demand due to disaster in the affected region, exogenous to the 
organization. The demand from the disaster in the affected region dictates the relief 
needed that is exogenous to the organization. However, the actual relief delivered is 
endogenous to the organization. The consequences of the delivery of HADR result 
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in gap of pain that originates when needs are not met by the organization. The gap 
of pain experienced by the regions affected by disasters forces the question of “why” 
to the players of the response supply chains. All these consequential steps are 
exogenous to the organization. However, the resulting playbook or a set of 
readiness metrics in answering of “why” is endogenous to the organization itself. The 
objective of our research in this project was to study existing literature to understand 
the process and ultimately to conceptualize a framework for readiness metrics.  
The Case for Naval HADR Operations 
The essential services and capabilities for disaster response as outlined by 
Apte et al. (2016) for military and non-military organizations are Information and 
Knowledge Management, Needs Assessment, Supply, Deployment and Distribution, 
and Health Service Support. If one focuses on military organizations and on the U.S. 
DoD, the capability of Information and Knowledge Management, for example, can be 
transformed into what is needed to be ready, an awareness of being ready, and a 
metric for readiness. Table 8 illustrates this process.  
Table 8: Process for Readiness Metrics From Capabilities. 
Need Awareness Readiness Metric 
• Hard Assets: Aerial 
Platform, Satellites, IT 
Equipment 
• Soft Assets: Database, 
Skilled Staff 
• Preset Threshold: The 
Mission, Situation 
Assessment 
• Plans for Gathering 
Intelligence 
• Testing and Evaluation 
• Exercises and Drills 
• Wargames 
• Inspection 
• Contingency Scenario 
Analysis 
• Current Status 
• Tradeoff between Risk 
Tolerance and Threat 
Level 
• Mission Essential 
Tasks (MET) 
• Assessment for 
Hard Assets 
• Cost vs. Capability 
• Past Exposure 
• Lessons Learned 
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The disasters of the past few decades and the lessons learned from them 
offer insight into the needs of the countries affected, whether their needs were met 
by the U.S. DoD, and the effectiveness of the DoD’s response. After Super Typhoon 
Haiyan there was massive damage to the infrastructure. The U.S. DoD’s principal 
capability of heavy vertical lift capabilities was critical in delivering disaster relief. 
This capability helped transport goods and people despite infrastructure destruction. 
This capability also helped rescue the affected population stranded on the many 
islands of the Philippines that are remote and difficult to access. USS George 
Washington naval task force and 31st MEU formed JTF 505 with about 1000 U.S. 
DoD personnel and were deployed to the Philippines. Military aircraft helped in 
understanding the demand through intelligence gathering. Without the Marines, it 
would have been impossible to clear the roads and distribute supplies and services. 
After the Nepal earthquake, the U.S. DoD service that could be used was the 
3rd MEB located in Okinawa since Nepal is a landlocked country. Adding to the MEB, 
JTF 505 was formed for deployment to help with HADR under the guidance of 
USAID. The terrain in Nepal tested the DoD equipment and the staff. Though rotary 
wing and tilt rotor aircraft supported the mission, the team casualties tried the 
resolve of the teams.  
The naval missions conducted for HADR in the past, as described in this 
research, help develop the Readiness Assessment Model. The output from the 
model must answer questions such as what is needed, is it there, what must be 
done, how can it be done, how can the gap between demand and supply be closed 
before a disaster strikes. There are many more variables that play a role in the 
model such as the type of the disaster (manmade or natural), onset of disaster 
(sudden or slow), relations with the host county, category of host country, and so 
forth. Figure 8 outlines the overview and conceptualization of the Readiness 
Assessment Model. 
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Output from the Model
Answer questions like
• What do I need?
• Do I have it?
• What must I do?
• Can I do it?
• How do I close the gap?
• How should I have done it?
• How can I be ready next 
time?
‘Playbook’: Readiness Assessment Model
Inputs to

















Figure 8: Overview of Readiness Assessment Model. 
In future research, we plan to dig deeper and build on the actual experiences 
of USN and USMC officers involved in HADR. The objective is to articulate the 
strategic readiness through operational details and answer the questions posed in 
Figure 8.  
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